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REFLECTIONS ON THE BOSNIA DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING 
MARK H. STUMPF* 
I 
A CALL FROM BUDAPEST 
On May 30, 1996, five months after Bosnia and Herzegovina had signed the 
Dayton Accords, Thomas P. Briggs, Senior Advisor of the U.S. Treasury Office 
of Technical Assistance (OTA), called from Budapest. Bosnia had agreed to 
assume a share of the former Yugoslavia’s external debt, and a critical deadline 
in the proceedings, June 11, 2006, was fast approaching. Two days later, the 
details began to unfold in a meeting in the OTA regional office in Budapest. 
II 
THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND THE DAYTON ACCORDS 
The war in Bosnia, which was brought to a close with the Dayton Accords at 
the end of 2005, is a complex, tragic story, the details of which have continued 
to be revealed as proceedings in the Hague bring new facts related to ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, systematic rape, and psychological abuse. 
The war lasted from 1992 to 1995. It was a multiparty conflict affecting the 
whole of the country. The scale of the calamity can be measured in the 
numbers: Of a population of 4.3 million people, 250,000 died; 200,000 were 
wounded, many with permanent disabilities; 800,000 became refugees abroad; 
half the house-holding population lost their homes; and 800,000 became 
displaced persons within the country.1 On the economic front, one statistic 
speaks volumes: Gross domestic product (GDP) fell from $10.6 billion in 1990 
to $2.1 billion in 1995.2 
From the perspective of the legal structure that was to prevail after Dayton, 
the critical milestones in the war were these: When Bosnia voted for 
independence in 1992, the Bosnian Serbs boycotted the proceedings and 
established their own entity—the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina—which, later that year, changed its name to Republika Srpska.3 A 
series of hostilities began, leading to war and ultimately to the siege of Sarajevo, 
the longest in modern history.4 Croatia and the Bosnian Serbs entered into a 
compact to divide up portions of Bosnia related to their respective ethnic 
groups, pursuant to the Karađorđevo Agreement.5 Hostilities between Bosniaks 
and Croats also ensued. Croats had created a separate republic called the 
Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia in November 1991.6 A ceasefire marking 
the end of Croat–Bosniak hostilities was signed in 1994.7 The peace agreement 
signed a month later—known as the Washington Agreement—established a 
federation between the Bosniaks and Croats called the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.8 
The Dayton Accords took a practical approach to the resolution of the 
conflict. The two entities that then existed—the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska—were recognized and preserved as entities 
of the state. The Bosnian state itself, in the nature of a thin, overarching 
superstructure, was superimposed over the two republics. This architecture 
provided a number of challenges for the assumption, restructuring, and ongoing 
servicing of the Yugoslav debt. 
The Dayton Accords were supposed to end the violence and put Bosnia on 
the road to reconstruction and stability. The Bosnians were not so sure. They 
referred to them as the Dayton ceasefire.  
III 
THE OTA 
Shortly after Dayton was signed, the OTA entered the picture. The OTA is 
a division of the U.S. Department of the Treasury that provides technical 
assistance without charge to countries with which the United States enjoys 
friendly relations and that are judged to lack sufficient wherewithal to pay for 
advice on their own—and in which the United States judges it has a strategic 
interest. Assuredly, the United States was keenly interested in events in the 
Balkans, and in Bosnia in particular. 
Countries can graduate from the program (the ultimate aim). The OTA 
places representatives in relevant government offices—ministries of finance, 
privatization agencies, and central banks—for extended periods of time, often 
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years. In the most successful of these arrangements, the OTA official is 
integrated as a valued member of the government team, on occasion even 
having an office next to the Minister of Finance. 
In concept, the advice given by the OTA is confidential and impartial, 
unaffected by the geostrategic goals of the U.S. government. In practice, the 
line is not so sharply drawn. The United States is, after all, the largest 
stakeholder in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
which are creditors of the debtor countries that receive OTA services. It also 
has key roles in the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) and in the 
U.N. Security Council. As will be seen, the conflicting impulses guiding the 
behavior of the United States in administering its advisory role were 
noteworthy at a critical juncture in the Bosnia proceedings. 
Thus, although the OTA service is free, there is a subtle, immeasurable cost 
to the recipient country. That said, the contributions of the OTA have been 
exceptional in a number of countries, and Bosnia stands out as a singular 
achievement, given all its adversities, both of the fractured situation of the 
country and of the multiple roles played by the United States in the resolution 
of the conflict. 
IV 
YUGOSLAVIA’S DEBT 
As Bosnia would later inform its creditors, the history of the Yugoslavian 
debt focused notably on the large borrowings between 1972 and 1982, when the 
total debt rose from $2.4 billion to $20.3 billion. Yugoslavia used the proceeds 
to finance investment and consumption at the public- and private-sector levels. 
Yugoslavia was a middle-income country with generous access to international 
bank financing. The debt crisis of the early 1980s saw that access sharply 
diminished. From that point forward, there was no net increase in borrowings, 
and Yugoslavia experienced a succession of debt restructurings in negotiations 
with the International Coordinating Committee (ICC) for the bank creditors of 
the former Yugoslavia, and relied on IMF loans up to the point of the country’s 
dissolution in 1991. It did manage to reduce the overall level of external debt in 
this period to approximately $15 billion. 
Upon the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia’s debt was 
apportioned on the basis of end-users where this was feasible (for example, 
projects funded by the debt in a particular republic), or in accordance with an 
IMF formula for debt of a general nature. The IMF formula was originally 
devised in order to determine how the parts of a former member country of the 
IMF would share in the debt burden to the IMF itself. 
The Dayton Accords required Bosnia to assume its share of this debt—
13.2%, according to the IMF formula. This was based on the relative strength of 
the economies within Yugoslavia before independence. Bosnia informed its 
creditors that, as of the restructuring-negotiation period, its GDP was no more 
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than five percent of the total GDP of all republics.9 In fact, the estimates for 
Bosnia’s 1996 economic performance show this most graphically: the ratio of 
debt to estimated exports, 600%; and debt to GDP, considerably in excess of 
100%.10 The banks also foresaw that Bosnia would not be able to handle its 
share based on this formula. For that, and other reasons, their agreements with 
Slovenia and Croatia covered a larger share than their allocable percentages 
(note that share of liabilities also meant share of assets). The savings were 
passed on to Bosnia, which took 10.58% of the commercial bank debt, which 
had been consolidated in a New Financing Agreement (NFA) dated September 
20, 1988, and related agreements. 
Yugoslavia had experienced a deteriorating economic and social 
environment in the 1980s, culminating in a political crisis fueled by nationalism 
and the impulse toward democratization. Bosnia, one of Yugoslavia’s six 
republics, lacked the necessary preparation for accession to a market-oriented 
economy. Its industrial economy was centered on armaments production for 
Yugoslavia, for other customers of the Eastern bloc, and for emerging markets. 
As Bosnia informed its creditors, “Equipment was obsolete, export goods were 
oriented to the demands of command economies rather than the international 
market, and the terms of trade for raw and semi-finished goods were . . . in 
secular decline.”11 Thus, at the outset of the conflict, Bosnia was in a weak and 
deteriorating economic condition. 
V 
THE SHRINKING DENOMINATOR 
Debt restructurings tend, to a greater or lesser degree, to follow an 
established pattern, which is akin to that of crisis management generally: seek 
to stabilize the situation while a solution can be developed; analyze the problem 
in an atmosphere of relative calm after stabilization has been implemented; 
negotiate a solution based on the sober-sided analysis thus achieved; and 
implement. 
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, stabilization was achieved by means of 
a consent agreement by participating banks. In the case of the NFA rollover, 
the banks were asked to consent to the release of joint and several liability of 
the republic and defined entities within the republic under the NFA and to 
certain technical waivers to facilitate the transaction. This was a prerequisite to 
the republic’s assumption of its portion of the NFA debt and the republic’s 
undertaking to service the debt directly, in accordance with the terms of any 
restructuring agreed to by the creditors. The waiver required a vote of the 
holders of not less than two-thirds of the debt then remaining in the NFA. In 
the case of Bosnia, particular circumstances conspired to limit the amount of 
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time available to obtain the waiver. The denominator was shrinking with each 
settlement, starting with Slovenia. As more debt was eliminated from the NFA, 
the blocking percentage held by the so-called connected persons—persons 
connected with the Serbian government—went up. After June 11, 1996, the 
likely percentage would exceed one-third, thereby constituting a blocking 
faction that could have defeated the consent. 
The ICC confirmed that the requisite consents had been received on June 
10, 1996. This was not the only cliffhanger associated with the consent process. 
By its terms, the benefits of the consent ceased to apply if an agreement in 
principle between Bosnia and the ICC had not been reached by June 30, 1997, 
and the transaction had not closed by December 31, 1997. The agreement-in-
principle date was intentionally lengthy to take account of the massive 
uncertainties facing Bosnia at the time the waiver was solicited. Yet that 
deadline posed challenges for reasons that were not part of the uncertainties 
contemplated by the parties to the consent. 
VI 
IN SARAJEVO 
After the waiver process was completed, the scene shifted to Sarajevo. 
Briggs had already been traveling there repeatedly since the beginning of the 
OTA engagement in Bosnia. The original OTA mission was budgetary and for 
other technical support, but Briggs saw that the debt issue was going to be 
fundamental to the reconstruction effort and steered the OTA toward the 
process at its outset. 
Notwithstanding Dayton, it was still a hazardous time in Sarajevo. Briggs 
was meeting in a café at the Sarajevo Holiday Inn (the scene of much violence 
during the siege) when the last person to die in the conflict was killed by a 
rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 100 yards away. A French artillery crew 
returned fire, apparently without effect. Briggs’s taxi narrowly missed being hit 
by an RPG fired from the same direction the following morning. 
With that last death, however, the nightmare siege, in the course of which 
thousands had been slaughtered, ended. 
In mid-1996, travel to Sarajevo was still by C-130 troop transport. The only 
dangerous parts of the trip were flying over territory where antiaircraft artillery 
was still not fully accounted for and the landing at the Sarajevo airport, which 
was ringed with land mines and thus not open to commercial aviation. Once on 
the ground, a USAID van, tires bulging from the extra weight of its armor 
plating, seemed an unnecessary precaution, as Sarajevo was at that point 
probably one of the safest places in the world, given its enormous concentration 
of NATO forces. But one needed to recall that this equipment was a holdover 
from a few months earlier when it would have been unthinkable to travel 
without it. 
Driving into the city, one passed by the remains of many newly constructed 
high-rise buildings that had been partially or fully destroyed by artillery fire, 
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with rebar twisting in odd, eerie configurations. Outside of Sarajevo in any 
direction, and certainly in the Serb stronghold above the town in Pale, one 
would not venture on one’s own without an armed escort. 
The High Representative’s office was the scene of a number of meetings. 
Carl Bildt, the very able High Representative, and a warm host, realized the 
importance of the preparations for the negotiation. The offices were notable for 
their vast collection of large maps with details that seemed to describe every 
square inch of the country. The Dayton boundaries were drawn, and the 
ensuing governance of the country was with an eye toward the minute details of 
terrain and population makeup. 
Electricity was limited, and when the generating capacity had to be rationed, 
the power would simply go off without warning, day or night. This might 
happen in a basement restaurant in the evening when the room was thrust into 
complete darkness—unnerving given the recent past. Or one could be in the 
elevator of a hotel and be trapped for hours if the elevator was not equipped 
with backup generators. 
The siege of Sarajevo was an intimate aspect of the war. The small mountain 
town was entirely encircled at close range by artillery, machine guns, and 
mortar emplacements. Walking down the main thoroughfares of Sarajevo in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, one could see continuous lines of pock marks 
in the walls of the buildings at head height. Weapons were aimed at individuals 
at close range. Casualties were enormous. A makeshift cemetery in a muddy 
field next to the soccer stadium where the 1984 Winter Olympics had taken 
place held large numbers of the dead in graves, marked by wooden, hand-
painted markers. 
VII 
INITIAL STEPS 
Once the OTA was engaged, Briggs went to work helping to organize a 
debt-negotiating team. The OTA’s immediate task was to help to bring the 
ethnic factions together in a workable committee that could find common 
ground on a debt-negotiation strategy. But even before that, it had to help the 
government think through why it should recognize the debt at all. Voices were 
heard to the effect that any Yugoslav debt should, by definition, be viewed as 
having been incurred to strengthen the ability of Serbia and its proxies to wage 
armed conflict against Bosnia. Thus, from the point of view of Bosnia, the debt 
might have been considered odious or illegal. This position did not take root, 
however, because a more powerful view prevailed: that Bosnia show to the 
outside world that it was a real, separate, viable republic, capable of shouldering 
its allocable share of the debt just as Slovenia and Croatia had agreed to do 
before it. 
Briggs worked with the Ministry of Finance to put together a negotiating 
team. The Bosnians realized from the outset that, in order to have credibility, 
the team would require at least one representative of the State, one from the 
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Federation, and one from Republika Srpska. The first two were identified early. 
It was harder to persuade the Serbs to field a member. When the Republika 
Srbska representative joined the team, there was a tense meeting, in which he 
clashed with one of the existing members and which degenerated into a 
shouting match and threatened to escalate to a fight. The two had been high-
school classmates and friends. From that time on, the team melded into an 
efficient working group and shared a keen desire to see to a successful outcome. 
The Committee members held the titles of Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade 
of the overarching State, the Deputy Minister of Finance of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Deputy Minister of Finance of Republika 
Srpska. 
The initial focus of the Bosnia negotiation process was quite different from 
that of Slovenia and Croatia in several respects. The reconciliation process by 
which the debt under the NFA was reconciled had been extensively discussed 
and resolved in Slovenia and there was no major impulse to reopen that issue. 
The asset side was a different matter but did not contribute importantly to the 
dynamics of the debt settlement in Bosnia. The issue of connected persons was 
also one that had been extensively (and contentiously) dealt with in the earlier 
transactions. In the Bosnia case, the ramifications of those earlier decisions 
were felt crucially, but the underlying development of the list was not. In part, 
the timing of the Slovenia and Croatia deals meant that time would not permit a 
relaxed analysis of these issues. The main focus was the shrinking denominator 
as creditors exchanged NFA debt for new instruments and ceased to be part of 
the NFA-debt-holding group, and as the connected persons gained a 
correspondingly greater percentage. 
This is not to say that the identity of the connected persons was 
fundamentally not of interest to Bosnia. On the contrary, Bosnia was adamantly 
opposed to connected persons’ receiving interests in debt that they would have 
to pay. Bosnia’s paying money to support its mortal enemy would have been 
unthinkable. But the groundwork had been laid for this result to transpire 
without considerable additional work, and the Bosnians had other issues not 
present in the preceding negotiations that took center stage. 
Because of the new constitutional framework, the two entities had to agree 
on how much of the debt burden each would bear. The state would be the 
obligor, but the state had limited revenues apart from receipts from the entities. 
The debt being assumed was, of course, an undivided interest in the totality of 
the former Yugoslav debt, but an amount equal to Bosnia’s actual receipts of a 
portion of that debt (more or less than the amount assumed) had to be arrived 
at in order to determine the share of the entities’ contribution to the state for 
debt service. Records were searched in an effort to follow the flow of funds into 
one or the other geographic regions. If the result was indeterminable or 
insufficient to cover the whole of the debt assumed, there would have to be an 
apportionment in accordance with a formula, similar to the concept by which 
the debt of the former Yugoslavia had been apportioned. This was largely 
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handled by the Bosnian factions, but the OTA supported and encouraged the 
reconciliation of differences among the factions so that agreement could be 
reached. 
Meetings with the ICC began with the consent solicitation and continued as 
Bosnia dealt with its domestic structural issues. From the outset, the ICC took 
an unsympathetic stance. Its view was that Bosnia would produce a certain 
amount of cash flow for debt service, and the only issue was how much and who 
was going to get it. It feared pressure because of the circumstances of the war 
and the emotions surrounding the hardship of the Bosnia case, but decided not 
to yield to that concern and to signal that it would not welcome pressure from 
governments or other interested parties on this theme. 
VIII 
DEBT-SERVICE LEGISLATION 
The country had a new framework and a new constitution, but no new body 
of laws. A wholly new concept of how the debt would be managed and serviced 
had to be devised from scratch. This effort resulted in one of the first laws 
passed by the new legislature—the Law on External State Debt.12 It was drafted 
by the U.S. Treasury with the external financial and legal advisers, and vetted 
by government officials at the technical and political levels. The law needed to 
deal with the reality that the entities had primary taxing authority. It had to 
contend with debt incurred in three distinct periods that required differing 
treatment: debt incurred in the prewar era, debt incurred by the entities during 
the war, and debt incurred from the signing of Dayton forward. It had to 
provide a mechanism for the entities to budget, in advance of the debt, for bills 
they would receive from the state. It had to allocate both on a final-beneficiary 
theory, whereby the proceeds of earlier debt could be traced, and on an 
unallocable-debt theory, whereby they could not. And it had to accomplish 
these objectives in such a way that satisfied the international financial 
community that a workable structure for debt servicing had been put in place. It 
also had to recognize that, quite apart from state debt, each entity had the 
power to incur indebtedness for its own purposes, for which it would be 
responsible for providing resources for debt servicing. 
In the end, the statute expressly excluded war debt incurred by either entity 
from state responsibility; that excluded debt was to remain the sole 
responsibility of the entity. The entity was to use its own taxing power to obtain 
resources for debt service. 
For pre-war international debt (including the portion of the NFA debt 
assumed) the law called for the determination of the final beneficiary of the 
debt proceeds.13 If the proceeds could be traced to one entity or another, that 
entity would be responsible for providing the state with the debt service 
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attributable to the debt, as modified or otherwise restructured.14 If the final 
beneficiary could not be determined, the entities would share the debt burden 
in a predetermined ratio.15 
IX 
THE NEGOTIATION 
The timetable for negotiations called for a conventional, three-step process 
with generous gaps between each to accommodate slippage: the IMF letter of 
intent (by July 1996), Paris Club agreement (by September 1996), and London 
Club agreement (agreement-in-principle by June 2007; settlement by December 
31, 2007).16 In this classic order, the overall economic plan, with targets for 
achievement of predetermined goals, would precede the Paris Club negotiation 
and underpin it. The Paris Club members could be confident that their 
settlement would be in the context of a rigorous, monitored economic plan so 
that the probabilities of repayment would be heightened. The London Club 
would then be expected to give debt relief comparable to the Paris Club 
agreement. 
Events did not unfold as planned, and, in the end, the expected process was 
turned on its head. 1996 came and went, and there was neither an IMF 
agreement nor a Paris Club agreement. 1997 saw more of the same—no 
agreement as to either the IMF or the Paris Club. Meanwhile, the deadline of 
June 30, 1997 that was stipulated in the consent, for agreement-in-principle, was 
moving inexorably closer. Finally, the negotiating committee and its advisers 
determined that the process simply could not await the established sequence 
and that London Club negotiations had to begin. 
Invitations to the meeting were sent, and relevant government officials 
made plans to travel for the meeting with the ICC that would establish the 
economic parameters of the debt settlement the country would have to live with 
for decades thereafter. 
And then suddenly, the United States and the IMF told Bosnia to cancel the 
meetings because the Bosnian government officials had to stay in Sarajevo to 
work on an IMF letter of intent. And if that meant missing the consent deadline 
and wrecking the chances for a London Club settlement, that was not as 
important as the IMF letter of intent that was scheduled to have happened over 
a year earlier. The OTA was ordered to cancel its plans to attend as well. 
This is not the only time the IMF has ignored the realities of legal 
undertakings by a sovereign to satisfy private-sector creditors. The IMF 
occasionally has trouble realizing that there are real-world consequences to the 
courses of action it seeks. And, given the original timetable and the full 
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knowledge of the legal requirements of the waiver deadline, the IMF actions 
were hard to justify. The United States, the IMF, and others thus precipitated a 
wave of ill-will in the Bosnian government. The fury was such that, even after 
the IMF and others relented and allowed the meetings to go forward, it was 
difficult to persuade the government to resume the negotiation. Moreover, the 
negotiating timeframe, which, it should be recalled, was set for four months, was 
now to be three days. 
The Bosnia case was a London Club negotiation that actually occurred in 
London. Given the time pressures, the atmosphere was one of permanent 
tension. Laptops were spitting out scenarios that had to be raced to caucuses 
bartering back and forth on net present value and other financial issues. The 
frustration level was high, but there was no choice but to forge ahead toward a 
solution. The GDP-performance-bond concept, described below, was the 
conceptual breakthrough that finally allowed all parties to come to agreement. 
It had a degree of contingency to satisfy the concerns of the Bosnians with the 
possibility of sufficient debt recovery to satisfy the banks. With little time to 
spare, the agreement-in-principal was reached and the deadline barely met. 
X 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY, VALUE RECOVERY 
In effect, the key issue for the negotiation was how much recovery a war-
ravaged economy could be expected to make in a timeframe compatible with 
recognizable international financial instruments. Clearly, the creditors would 
not accept the proposition that the GDP, which had collapsed by eighty 
percent, would remain that low forever. Yet there were not only the effects of 
the war to contend with, but also the fact that Bosnia’s economy was a 
command economy before the war with obsolete productive capacity. How 
should this be factored into the equation? 
When creditors are asked to give debt relief, they regularly consider the 
question whether the debtor will be able to regain the capacity to service its 
debt in the future. In the private sector, the creditors may require an ownership 
stake in the debtor in the context of giving debt relief in order to obtain such 
value recovery. In the sovereign context, since equity is not a relevant concept 
(in the case of a central government, that is) the value recovery must come in 
other forms. 
When the debtor is a primary-commodity producer, value recovery has 
come in the form of instruments that gain value if the primary commodity rises 
in price. For example, Mexico and Venezuela gave instruments related to the 
price of oil in their Brady plans. Taking the Venezuela case for illustration, the 
Venezuelan debt problem was materially related to the price of oil—its major 
income- and foreign-exchange generator. The Venezuela oil obligations value 
the Venezuelan oil basket and measure it against a strike price that is adjusted 
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by an inflation factor.17 The oil obligations were originally attached to par and 
discount bonds pursuant to which creditors gave substantial debt relief based on 
the low price of oil.18 Thus, the oil obligations would allow the creditors to 
recapture value if circumstances in the oil markets improved and the capacity of 
the country to pay correspondingly improved. 
In the Venezuela example, another type of bond was first introduced—the 
Front-Loaded Interest Reduction Bond (FLIRB), which can be thought of as a 
noncontingent value-recovery instrument. A FLIRB begins life with a below-
market fixed interest rate.19 Typically, over a period of five years or more, the 
fixed, below-market rate increases in increments.20 At the fifth (or later) year, 
the fixed-interest period ends and the bond moves into floating-rate mode, at a 
spread over a floating base rate (London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)).21 
Interest during the initial below-market period may be secured by collateral. 
The collateral is removed at the end of the fixed-rate period.22 The theory is that 
the FLIRBs give the country breathing room to address its financial difficulties, 
though only for a while. Unlike the commodity-related instruments, which may 
or may not ever go “in the money,”23 the FLIRB follows a predetermined 
pattern of lesser and lesser debt relief, culminating in a market-oriented floating 
rate. 
The FLIRB was invented by a member bank of the Venezuela Brady bank 
advisory committee. The institution made a valiant attempt to patent the idea in 
the sense of requesting (actually, forcefully arguing for) a fee for the invention. 
This was not to happen. It was not the first time that a bank had sought to step 
out ahead of its colleagues to insist that its special contribution—time, ideas—
merited special consideration. From the sovereign’s perspective, this request 
makes for awkwardness on many fronts. For one thing, it undermines the 
cohesiveness of the committee. It opens a Pandora’s Box of potentially 
competing claims. And it presents a difficult issue of where the money would 
come from to pay the fee. Happily, these thorny issues are resolved by just 
saying no. 
Bosnia used the FLIRB as one of the two instruments in the package of 
bonds offered to the bank creditors. Constituting 35% of the package, the 
Bosnian FLIRBs share a number of features of the original FLIRBs. In keeping 
with the front-loaded-reduction concept, the FLIRBs were structured such that, 
for the first four years, they bore interest at a fixed rate of 2%. For the next 
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three years, the rate was 3%. For years eight through ten, the rate was 3.5%. 
And from the tenth anniversary of the date of issuance until maturity, the rate 
changed to a floating rate—LIBOR (now Euribor) plus 13/16%.24 
The second part of the package was a bond that related the obligation to pay 
to the GDP per capita of Bosnia. At the time, this bond was an innovation, not 
based on any known precedent. Its architecture had to be put together from 
scratch. It grew out of a number of discussions with the bank committee, the 
advisers, and the government. Fortunately, no institution had its hand out for a 
creation fee for this instrument. In part, this may be because the banks were not 
the primary authors of the idea: credit most likely belongs more to the OTA 
than the banks. Overall, the bond made a breakthrough in the difficult 
negotiations and paved the way to agreement. 
The GDP Performance Bonds have as their premise the concept that the 
Bosnian economy was most closely tied to the German economy. In fact, for the 
first ten years following the Dayton Accords, there was to be a currency board 
linked to the Deutsche Mark (DM). The GDP-performance bonds were subject 
to activation if economic circumstances in Bosnia improved to a level that could 
be agreed to reflect debt sustainability for interest and principal service on the 
debt. This would not happen until 2007 at the earliest. The GDP trigger is an 
on-off switch; there are no gradations. If the average of two consecutive years of 
per capita GDP starting in the year 2004 exceeds a strike amount, which is 
increased with reference to German inflation, the bonds go live. 
Both series are callable. Both are denominated in DMs (now euros). 
The trigger is adjusted by German inflation. The base year 1997 trigger is 
$2,800 and is adjusted each year thereafter by the consumer price index (CPI) 
change. This is calculated by dividing the current year’s CPI by the prior year’s 
CPI, multiplying the result by 100, and subtracting 100 from the resulting 
product. Thus if the CPI had been 109.8 in 1998 and 105 in 1997 (a typical way a 
multiyear inflation index is expressed), the factor used to adjust the trigger is 
4.47193%, calculated by dividing 109.8 by 105.1 (1.04471931), multiplying the 
resulting figure by 100 (104.47193149), and subtracting 100 (4.47193149%). The 
trigger thus becomes $2,800 plus 4.47193% or $2,925.21 for 1998. And so on. 
The GDP per capita figure comes from the World Bank, to avoid the moral 
hazard associated with allowing the issuer to calculate its own, with the 
attendant possibilities of manipulation. The bonds go live if the two-
consecutive-year test is met in the period 2004 through 2017. It was felt that 
requiring the trigger to be exceeded in two consecutive years was the safest way 
to avoid an unusual spike in economic activity. 
Those designing the formula sought a measure of long-term debt 
sustainability. Given the catastrophic drop in Bosnian GDP, this was considered 
a crucial measure of debt-service capacity. But by the same measure, the 
immediate postwar period, before reconstruction had had a chance to take hold, 
 
 24. Bond Information Memorandum, supra note 1, at 29. 
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was not considered the correct baseline for determining long-term debt-service 
capacity. Obviously, given the circumstances, a great deal of educated 
guesswork went into the calculus. But the time factors (ten years plus before the 
performance bonds could go live) made for an insurance policy against guessing 
wrong on the relationship between GDP per capita and debt sustainability. 
If the bonds were to go live, the principal would be paid in twenty-four 
equal installments beginning six months after the Performance Addition Date25 
(if any). Thus, the bonds were structured so that they could have a very long-
dated maturity. Interest on the GDP-performance bonds accrues only after the 
performance-addition date and is at LIBOR plus 13/16%, the same as the 
FLIRBs after the front-loaded interest-reduction period has passed. 
XI 
OBSERVATIONS ON LONG-DATED DEBT SOLUTIONS 
Sovereign debt restructurings tend to give rise to long-dated solutions. The 
Bosnia case is no exception. The GDP-performance bonds, by design, could not 
begin amortizing until a decade after issuance and might not finally be retired 
until over thirty years after the settlement. The fiscal agent was required to 
make calculations for years before a triggering event would actually make use 
of the data. 
In other long-tail sovereign restructurings, a number of practical problems 
have arisen. The fiscal and other agents handling the issue retire or go on to 
other employment. The agency functions are sold from one bank to another. 
The paperwork is handled out of multiple offices or, in one case, from the home 
of one of the agent employees. Memories fade as to what is to be done. Should 
a calculation be done every X months? Who remembers? Even the question of 
who is supposed to keep track of the issue is in doubt. Data-maintenance 
systems do not seem to function well after ten years. 
The clearing systems maintain records that become relevant in this regard. 
One difficulty with long-dated issues is that their systems are, in certain cases, 
kept by hand and copied on microfiche. The images fade like an old movie and 
become hard to read. In a recent case, Euroclear advised that reconstructing 
records could take several months and, in the end, might be impossible because 
of the illegibility of the records. 
Another problem is that the lawyers and other professional advisers on debt 
restructurings, particularly in countries with budgetary constraints that do not 
have regular access to the international financial markets, are hired for the 
transaction alone. When the closing occurs, the mandate and the funding for it 
 
 25. See id. at 31–32 (The Performance Addition Date means the Payment Date following the date 
on which the Fiscal Agent determines that Bosnia and Herzegovina has achieved per capita Gross 
Domestic Product (“GDP”) equal to or greater than the GDP Performance Trigger for two consecutive 
calendar years in the period commencing with the year 2004 and ending with the year 2017; provided 
that the Performance Addition Date will in no event occur prior to the Payment Date next succeeding 
the 10th anniversary of the Issue Date.). 
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end. If there are follow-up issues, which are inevitable in complex agreements 
of this nature, there is no one to address the question except perhaps an internal 
government lawyer who was not present at the creation and does not have the 
benefit of the experience of putting together the instruments in the first 
instance. One could argue that the instruments should speak for themselves, but 
someone has to figure out what they are saying. 
There is probably no perfect solution to this dilemma, and certainly the 
solution is not to shorten the restructuring period, for this would hardly serve 
the interests of the sovereign, or likely the creditors, either. But more thought 
needs to be given to mechanisms to police the performance and interpretation 
of the instruments until maturity, including a detailed tickler system. (We 
worked for a month or more on one such document for a different sovereign 
and have no evidence that it was ever put to functional use.) Such mechanisms 
might also include a predetermined periodic review of events and circumstances 
between the sovereign and its agents, and an outside party given the mandate 
and authority to make it happen. (A law firm would likely be the best, given the 
professional responsibility and the relative effectiveness of the institutional 
memory of such firms.) 
XII 
POSTSCRIPT 
The Bosnian government justifiably considered the transaction a major 
milestone that would be noted as such by the world. The world’s attention was 
unfortunately drifting elsewhere. In fact, the announcement of the transaction 
was little noticed, and Bosnia quickly receded from the front page as Kosovo 
and other crises took its place. It is a cautionary note to post-crisis countries 
that a strategy for recovery should be undertaken quickly, while world support 
is present, but with a realistic appreciation of the medium- and long-term 
sustainability of the world’s interest and sympathy. 
Recently, over a decade after the settlement was reached, the world’s 
attention is beginning to reawaken regarding Bosnia, and not in a positive way. 
The portents are ominous. The ethnic tensions effectively frozen in place by the 
Dayton constitutional structure have caused a degree of paralysis in the 
government. Civil unrest is being felt. And there is even talk of the possibility of 
the resumption of violence. It could be that the Dayton Accords will end up 
serving as a fragile truce masking powerful forces of disintegration that were 
not cured and perhaps even made worse. 
Meanwhile, on July 29, 2009, the fiscal agent, Société Générale Bank & 
Trust S.A., sent a notice to bondholders stating that the GDP per capita for 
Bosnia had exceeded the GDP-performance trigger for 2007 and 2008, the two 
consecutive years required to turn the on-off switch in the bonds to on, effective 
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on December 11, 2009.26 A number of holders, however, contend that the two 
consecutive years of requisite GDP performance occurred in 2006 and 2007. 
The debate has given rise to several observations about the GDP–per capita 
performance mechanism: (1) The census of Bosnia upon which the per capita 
figure is to be based has not been taken since the war, and there are intense 
political sensitivities surrounding any such program, given the consequences for 
the ethnic composition of the country and its entities; (2) The system by which 
national accounts are calculated has only recently been updated to adjust for 
the treatment of the informal economy; (3) And there is a triangular effect of 
pegging the Bosnian currency to the DM—now the euro—which, when coupled 
with the appreciation (in the years under contention) of the euro against the 
dollar, has boosted the GDP in dollar terms, which is the relevant term of 
reference for the performance bonds. 
But it is noteworthy that in the Société Générale release, the GDP figure for 
2008 was shown at the level of $18.4 billion.27 This figure comes close to 900% of 
the GDP figure for the year the war ended. Even if euro-to-dollar inflation 
impact is considered, this is an impressive and hopeful sign of progress in the 
country. 
 
 
 26. Notice from the Société Générale Bank & Trust S.A. to the Noteholders 1 (July 15, 2009) (on 
file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 27. Id. 
